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Abstract
This dissertation investigates robust optimization models for performance attribution analysis in
investment management. Specifically, an investment manager seeks to evaluate the performance
of fund managers who manage funds he might invest his clients’ money in. A key difficulty for
the investment manager is to quantify the fund manager’s skill when he may not know the fund
manager’s allocation precisely. This introduces two main sources of uncertainty for the investment
manager: the stock returns and the fund allocations. This dissertation proposes and analyzes robust,
quantitative models to address this challenge. We study a robust counterpart to the mean-variance
framework when the fund managers’ precise allocations are uncertain but belong to known intervals
and must sum to one for each manager, present an algorithm to solve the problem efficiently and
analyze the investment manager’s allocation in the various funds as a function of the benchmark
return. Further, we consider the case where the stock returns are also represented as uncertain
parameters belonging to a polyhedral set, the size of which is defined by a parameter called the
budget of uncertainty, and the investment manager seeks to maximize his worst-case return. We
describe how to solve this problem efficiently and analyze how the investment manager’s degree of
diversification and his specific allocations in the funds vary with the budget of uncertainty.
1
Chapter 1
Literature Review and Contributions
1.1 Motivation
Traditional performance attribution analysis decomposes the fund return into an active management
component (reflecting the fund manager’s skill) and a passive management component (reflecting
stock performance) by taking the average of the active-management and passive-management re-
turns, respectively, over a given time period. This approach does not investigate the fund managers’
strategies, especially with respect to possible market scenarios, in great detail. In fact, investors
could lose important information on fund managers’ ability to manage their assets when facing dif-
ferent market conditions, especially in times of crisis, which makes it difficult to evaluate the risks
associated with the fund manager’s strategy under those circumstances.
From a portfolio construction perspective, investors usually construct their portfolio by consid-
ering a trade-off between maximizing the total return and minimizing the total (or downside) risk
of the portfolio. The traditional portfolio model does not take into account the uncertainty associate
with manager’s asset allocation in the portfolio construction procedure. In this research, we will
investigate the interaction effect of the active management from multiple managers, and seek to
incorporate uncertainty embedded in both asset return and manager’s asset allocation in the context
of portfolio construction model. This dissertation describes a robust optimization approach to select
fund managers by considering two majority risk fund manager bears, with contributions presented
in Section 1.2 below.
2
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS
1.2 Contributions
The high-level contribution we make through this dissertation is to provide financial professionals
with robust, quantitative decision tools to help them make manager selection policy in presence
of uncertainty, especially taking into account uncertainty on the fund allocation and capturing that
stock returns and uncertainty on asset return itself.
We propose two models that build upon the robust optimization framework by considering
multi-source uncertainties:
i. Robust Portfolio Management with Uncertainty in Asset Allocation Attribution Analysis,
ii. Robust Portfolio Management with Uncertainty in Asset Allocation and Asset Return.
This dissertation is organized as follows. The remainder of this chapter contains a literature
review of performance attribution analysis and robust portfolio management. Chapter 2 presents the
model taking account uncertainty in manager’s asset allocation, with Section 2.1 describing the mo-
tivation of the model, Section 2.2 describing the robust manager selection framework, Section 2.3
proposing two approaches to solve the problem efficiently. Section 2.4 presenting solid numerical
results of manager selection policy under our new model and old model, and demonstrating that the
robust model provide a strong protection of the downside return, 2.5 concluding the contribution
and remarks of the framework. Chapter 3 presents the second model by taking account uncertainty
in both manager’s asset allocation and asset return, with Section 3.1 describing the motivation of
the model, Section 3.2 describing the problem setup and two frameworks, Section 3.3 presenting
the upper and lower bound of the robust framework, Section 3.4 exploring the special structure of
the problem and proposing two approaches to solve the problem efficiently. Section 3.5 present-
ing solid numerical results of manager selection policy under our new model, 3.6 concluding the
contributions.
1.3 Literature Review
Fund performance attribution analysis is a way to explain the fund manager’s performance versus
the benchmark. It is very important for investors because it can help them better understand how
3
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the return is generated and why the return for a fund differs from a benchmark’s. For some of the
funds, asset allocation plays the most important role in the total return, while for some other funds,
stock selection contributes more. A better understanding of performance attribution will allow
investors to make better investment decisions and find the best fund suitable for their purposes and
risk tolerance. In addition, in presence of high volatility and high correlation between asset classes
– as is the case nowadays – the ability of taking “robust” decisions when making guesses on the
market is crucial for a successful fund manager. Comparing with traditional ways of appraising
fund managers’ performance such as his alpha, Sharpe ratio and information ratio, a dynamic fund
attribution analysis provides more information about a fund manager’s forecasting power and risk
management skills.
1.3.1 Arithmetic excess return
Arithmetic excess return can be expressed as the difference between the portfolio (arithmetic aver-
age) return and benchmark return. It captures by how much the manager’s fund beat the benchmark
as a percentage of the initial investment. The key rules for the arithmetic model are that (i) the
sum of different attribution effects must equal the arithmetic excess return, and (ii) for multi-period
frameworks, the sum of different attribution effects over time must equal the arithmetic excess return
over the whole time horizon considered.
Brinson Model
Brinson et al. [16] have proposed a method to decompose the manager’s added value into three
factors:
• Asset Allocation,
• Stock Selection,
• Intersection between the two.
The asset allocation effect measures the manager’s skill in allocating his assets among different in-
dustry sectors. It can be expressed as the difference between returns if the benchmark returns are ap-
plied to the portfolio weight and the benchmark weights, respectively, i.e.
∑
i∈I Rbi(ωfi−ωbi). The
4
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security selection effect is to measure the manager’s skill in picking the high-return stocks in each
of these groups. It can be expressed as the difference between returns if the benchmark weights are
applied to the difference between the fund return and benchmark return, i.e.
∑
i∈I ωbi(Rfi − Rbi).
The intersection between the two is the product of the difference in weight and difference in returns,
i.e.
∑
i∈I(ωfi − ωbi)(Rfi − Rbi). The summation is performed based on different sectors, for in-
stance, country sector, industry sector, size or momentums.
Drawbacks of Brinson et al. [16]’s analysis are that (i) it does not incorporate the fact that over-
weighting a portfolio in a negative market that has outperformed the overall benchmark should still
be a positive effect, (ii) it fails to distinguish between the static manager and dynamic manager,
who is trying to capture the opportunity when the market is up for one sector and over-weigh his
portfolio weights on that sector.
The model in Brinson and Fachler [15] solves the first weakness by modifying the asset alloca-
tion factor to compare the return against the overall benchmark, as opposed to considering the pure
negative or positive return for a sector. The asset allocation factor in the Brinson and Fachler model
is
∑
i(ωfi−ωbi)(rbi−rb), where rb is the overall return of the benchmark, and i denotes the sector.
The fund manager could generate positive asset allocation return in two situations, overweight in
an above-average performance sector or underweight in a below-average sector. The security selec-
tion effect is the same with the original model, which is to measure manager’s skill in picking the
high-return stocks in each of these groups. It can be expressed by applying the benchmark weights
to the difference between the fund return and benchmark return, i.e.
∑
i ωbi(rfi − rbi). The authors
argue that this component might not reflect the stock selection effect correctly due to market size
effect. A minor outperformance in a large-cap market could result in a larger stock selection com-
ponent than a substantial outperformance in a small-cap market. This weakness could be overcome
by constructing a time series of the differential between the fund return and benchmark return for a
sector. The intersection between the two is also the same as in the original model, i.e., it is the cross
product of the difference in weight and difference in returns:
∑
i(ωfi − ωbi)(rfi − rbi). However,
given that the interaction term is not part of the investment decision process, Brinson and Fachler
5
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further improved the model by including the interaction effect into the stock selection effect. Actual
portfolio weights, as opposed to benchmark portfolio weights, are then used to calculate the stock
selection effect. The stock selection factor is therefore
∑
i ωfi(rfi − rbi) in the revised model.
Examples of three different single-period models are illustrated in Tables 1.1 and 1.2.
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Table 1.1: Single Period Data [7]
Equity Portfolio Portfolio Weight Benchmark Weight Portfolio Return Benchmark Return Excess Return Allocation Notional Return Selection Notional Return
UK Equity 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 10.00% 4.00% 4.00% 8.00%
Japanese equity 30.00% 20.00% -5.00% -4.00% -0.70% -1.20% -1.00%
US Equity 30.00% 40.00% 6.00% 8.00% -1.40% 2.40% 2.40%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 8.30% 6.40% 1.90% 5.20% 9.40%
Table 1.2: Single Period Results [7]
Arithmetric Model Geometric Model
Brinson Arithmetric Brinson & Fachler Model 1 Brinson & Fachler Model 2 Geometric
Equity Portfolio Asset Allocation Stock Selection Intersection Asset Allocation Stock Selection Intersection Asset Allocation Stock Selection Asset Allocation Security Selection
UK Equity 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 4.00%
Japanese equity -0.40% -0.20% -0.10% -0.40% -0.20% -0.10% -0.40% -0.30% -0.40% -0.30%
US Equity -0.80% -0.80% 0.20% -0.80% -0.80% 0.20% -0.80% -0.60% -0.80% -0.60%
Total -1.20% 3.00% 0.10% -1.20% 3.00% 0.10% -1.20% 3.10% -1.20% 3.10%
7
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Multi-period Model
Multi-period arithmetic model suffers from a linking issue of transferring single period attribution
factors to total period attribution factors. Since the sum of the excess returns for each period does not
equal the total arithmetic excess return, the arithmetic attribution factors should also not be expected
to add up to arithmetic attribution factors for the total period. Carino [19] and Menchero [50] both
suggested a smoothing algorithm by introducing a factor that could transform single-period perfor-
mance to its total-period counterpart by summing up single-period performances attribution over
time. By multiplying this factor to the asset allocation factor, security selection factor and inter-
section factor for each period, these revised attribution factors are additive for the total period. It
should be noted that the revised attribution factors are different for the length of overall period for
analysis, i.e., the revised attribution factor for a quarter is different from the factor for one year and
two years. These factors are effective, but also counter-intuitive and cumbersome. Examples are
illustrated in Tables 1.3 and 1.4.
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Table 1.3: Multi-Period Model [7]
Portfolio Weight Benchmark Weight Portfolio Return Benchmark Return Excess Return Allocation Notional Return Selection Notional Return
1st Quarter
UK Equity 40.00% 40.00% 20.00% 10.00% 10.00% 4.00% 8.00%
Japanese equity 30.00% 20.00% -5.00% -4.00% -1.00% -1.20% -1.00%
US Equity 30.00% 40.00% 6.00% 8.00% -2.00% 2.40% 2.40%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 5.20% -5.20% 5.20% 9.40%
2nd Quarter
UK Equity 70.00% 40.00% -5.00% -7.00% 2.00% -4.90% -2.00%
Japanese equity 20.00% 30.00% 3.00% 4.00% -1.00% 0.80% 0.90%
US Equity 10.00% 30.00% -5.00% -10.00% 5.00% -1.00% -1.50%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% -5.10% 5.10% -5.10% -2.60%
3rd Quarter
UK Equity 30.00% 50.00% -20.00% -25.00% 5.00% -7.50% -10.00%
Japanese equity 50.00% 40.00% 8.00% 5.00% 3.00% 2.50% 3.20%
US Equity 20.00% 10.00% -15.00% -20.00% 5.00% -4.00% -1.50%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% -9.00% 9.00% -9.00% -8.30%
4th Quarter
UK Equity 30.00% 40.00% 10.00% 5.00% 5.00% 1.50% 4.00%
Japanese equity 50.00% 40.00% -7.00% -5.00% -2.00% -2.50% -2.80%
US Equity 20.00% 20.00% 25.00% 10.00% 15.00% 2.00% 5.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% 1.00% -1.00% 1.00% 6.20%9
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Table 1.4: Multi-Period Model Results [7]
Carino Revised Attribution (Brinson and Fachler 2) Menchero Revised Attribution (Brinson and Fachler 2) Geometric
Carino Factor Asset Allocation Stock Selection M t Asset Allocation Stock Selection Asset Allocation Stock Selection
1st Quarter 97.81%
UK Equity 97.49% 0.00% 3.62% 1.28% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 3.66%
Japanese equity -0.94% -0.27% 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% -0.27%
US Equity -0.14% -0.54% 0.00% 0.00% -1.39% -0.55%
Total -1.09% 2.80% 0.00% 0.00% -1.27% 2.83%
2nd Quarter
UK Equity 102.64% -0.73% 1.42% 0.95% 0.01% 0.00% -3.45% 1.44%
Japanese equity -0.87% -0.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.10% -0.21%
US Equity 1.09% 0.51% -0.01% 0.00% 2.87% 0.51%
Total -0.51% 1.72% -0.01% 0.00% -0.48% 1.75%
3rd Quarter
UK Equity 104.79% 2.66% 1.60% 5.07% -0.03% 0.00% 6.24% 1.64%
Japanese equity 1.86% 1.60% 0.05% 0.00% -0.37% 1.64%
US Equity -0.80% 1.06% -0.05% 0.00% -2.66% 1.09%
Total 3.73% 4.26% -0.03% 0.00% 3.21% 4.36%
4th Quarter
UK Equity 99.50% -0.28% 1.41% 1.69% -0.01% 0.00% -0.61% 1.41%
Japanese equity -0.66% -0.94% -0.01% 0.00% -0.40% -0.94%
US Equity 0.00% 2.82% -0.05% 0.00% 0.00% 2.82%
Total -0.94% 3.29% -0.07% 0.00% -1.01% 3.30%
TOTAL 1.19% 12.07% -0.11% 0.00% 0.40% 12.79%
Four Quarter Total
UK Equity 1.65% 8.04% -0.03% 0.00% 1.95% 8.38%
Japanese equity -0.61% 0.18% 0.03% 0.00% -0.54% 0.20%
US Equity 0.15% 3.85% -0.11% 0.00% -1.26% 3.91%
Total 1.19% 12.07% -0.11% 0.00% 0.12% 12.83%
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Davies and Laker [23] and Kirievsky and Kirievsky [44] suggest applying Brinson’s model over
multiple periods. They calculate the allocation’s notional return and selection’s notional return for
each time period respectively, then calculate the allocation’s notional return and selection’s notional
return for the total period by compounding the return of each time period. The attribution fac-
tors are then the difference between the asset allocation return for compounded notional funds and
benchmark return. This method combines the arithmetic and geometric concepts.
1.3.2 Active Performance Measure
The Capital Asset Pricing Model was the first model to decompose the fund return into system-
atic risk return and unsystematic risk return. The unsystematic return could be considered as the
value-added of the manager’s performance. Treynor [67], Sharpe [63], Jensen [41] and Jensen [42]
developed risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio and Infor-
mation Ratio to evaluate the fund manager’s performance. However, the drawbacks are that these
measures are all static measures, based on the characteristics of returns of a single time period.
Treynor and Mazuy [69] proposed a method to measure the fund managers’s ability to capture the
up market by introducing the quadratic term (Rmt−Rf )2. Arnott et al. [5] and Treynor [68] consid-
ered the covariance between portfolio weights and returns but this was only discussed in the context
of improving the fundamental indexation. Grinblatt and Titman [35] pointed out that the positive
covariance between portfolio weights and returns should bring benefit to investors, and proposed a
measure to capture this property.
Dynamic Model
The classic Brinson’s analysis is based on a single-period framework and assumes that the portfolio
holdings (weights) is static, which is not suitable for active management where weights can be
changed over multiple time periods. Dealing with multi-period models by repeating the classic
Brinson’s method for multiple time periods is subject to several weaknesses as mentioned above.
Lo [47] and Hsu and Myers [38] both proposed approaches to capture the static and dynamic
contributions of a fund manager’s performance. In their model, weights are considered to be a
11
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stochastic process (like asset returns) as opposed to fixed parameters. The dynamic component is
measured by the sum of covariances between returns and portfolio weights.
Hsu improved Brinson’s model by further decomposing the allocation effect according to the
static allocation added-value and dynamic allocation added-value. Considering the cumbersome na-
ture of computing the covariance, the dynamic allocation added-value is computed as the difference
between the total allocation added-value and static added-value. In this case, the manager’s total
added-value is composed of three factors, (i) static allocation added value, (ii) dynamic allocation
added value and (iii) security selection added value. Hsu’s method could allow investors to easily
identify whether a fund is passively managed or actively managed.
In Lo [47]’s model, the sum of covariances between returns and portfolio weights was used to
measure the dynamic effect (named Active Component in his paper), and a static weighted-average
of the individual securities’ expected return was used to measure the static effect (named Passive
Component in his paper). Positive covariance between weights and returns implied a successful
dynamic management, while a negative one implied a poorly dynamic effect for portfolio’s return.
Lo further decomposed the covariance matrix as the product of standard deviation of weights, stan-
dard deviation of returns and correlation between weights and returns. He argued that both static
weight (standard deviation of weights equals to zero) and non-correlation between weights and re-
turns (even weights various over time) could be considered as passive management. Lo [47] also
proposed a factor-based Active-Passive decomposition method for the case where the return of each
asset satisfied a linear K-factor model.
The significant difference between the two dynamic models is that the definitions of “security
selection” and “asset allocation” in Hsu and Myers [38] depend critically on the benchmark, which
might be appropriate for managers whose target is to beat certain benchmarks, but will be less
natural for certain hedge fund strategies. Lo is trying to capture time-series measures of a manager’s
forecasting power without considering a specific benchmark.
Examples of Lo’s model and Hsu’s model are illustrated in Tables 1.5-1.10.
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Table 1.5: Active Management Portfolio vs Benchmark
Portfolio 1: Active Management Portfolio Benchmark
Quarterly
Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
Quarterly
Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 13.000% 75% 16% 0.437% 4.470% 4.907% 10.000% 50% 16% 0.000% 4.500% 4.500%
2nd Quarter 9.800% 10% 8% 9.000% 50% 8%
3rd Quarter 1.200% 64% 3% 0.500% 50% 3%
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 13.00% 25% 4% 1.080% 2.013% 3.093% 10.000% 50% 4% 0.000% 2.000% 2.000%
2nd Quarter 9.80% 90% 10% 9.000% 50% 10%
3rd Quarter 1.20% 36% -2% 0.500% 50% -2%
Total Portfolio 1.517% 6.483% 8.000% 0.000% 6.500% 6.500%
Table 1.6: Active Management Portfolio vs Benchmark (2)
Hsu Lo
Excess Return Factors Decomposition Expected Return Analysis For Portfolio 1
Stock Selection
Factor
Asset Allocation Factor Total Return Factors Total
Stock Selection Dynamic Asset
Allocation
Static Asset Allo-
cation
Total Asset Allo-
cation
Total Excess Re-
turn
Active Compo-
nent
Active Compo-
nen
Expected Total
Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.758% -0.01% 0.750% 0.7500% 0.437% 4.470% 4.907%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.758% -0.01% 0.750% 0.7500% 1.080% 2.013% 3.093%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Total Portfolio 0.000% 1.517% -0.017% 1.500% 1.500% 1.517% 6.483% 8.000%
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Table 1.7: Active Management Portfolio vs Passive Management Portfolio
Portfolio 1: Active Management Portfolio Portfolio 2 : Passive Management Portfolio
Quarterly Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
Quarterly Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 13.000% 75% 16% 0.437% 4.470% 4.907% 13.600% 80% 16% 0.000% 7.200% 7.200%
2nd Quarter 9.800% 10% 8% 8.400% 80% 8%
3rd Quarter 1.200% 64% 3% 2.000% 80% 3%
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 13.00% 25% 4% 1.080% 2.013% 3.093% 10.000% 20% 4% 0.000% 0.800% 0.800%
2nd Quarter 9.80% 90% 10% 9.000% 20% 10%
3rd Quarter 1.20% 36% -2% 0.500% 20% -2%
Total Portfolio 1.517% 6.483% 8.000% 0.000% 8.000% 8.000%
Table 1.8: Active Management Portfolio vs Passive Management Portfolio (2)
Hsu Lo
Excess Return Factors Decomposition Expected Return Analysis For Portfolio 1
Stock Selection
Factor
Asset Allocation Factor Total Return Factors Total
Stock Selection Dynamic Asset
Allocation
Static Asset Allo-
cation
Total Asset Allo-
cation
Total Excess Re-
turn
Active Compo-
nent
Active Compo-
nent
Expected Total
Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.303% -0.30% 0.000% 0.0000% 0.437% 4.470% 4.907%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.758% -0.76% 0.000% 0.0000% 1.080% 2.013% 3.093%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Total Portfolio 0.000% 1.062% -1.062% 0.000% 0.000% 1.517% 6.483% 8.000%
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Table 1.9: Passive Management Portfolio vs Benchmark
Portfolio 2: Passive Management Portfolio Benchmark
Quarterly Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
Quarterly Portfolio
Total Return
Weight Return Expected Ac-
tive Return
Expected Pas-
sive Return
Expected To-
tal Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 13.600% 80% 16% 0.000% 7.200% 7.200% 10.000% 50% 16% 0.000% 4.500% 4.500%
2nd Quarter 8.400% 80% 8% 9.000% 50% 8%
3rd Quarter 2.000% 80% 3% 0.500% 50% 3%
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 13.00% 20% 4% 0.000% 0.800% 0.800% 10.000% 50% 4% 0.000% 2.000% 2.000%
2nd Quarter 9.80% 20% 10% 9.000% 50% 10%
3rd Quarter 1.20% 20% -2% 0.500% 50% -2%
Total Portfolio 0.000% 8.000% 8.000% 0.000% 6.500% 6.500%
Table 1.10: Passive Management Portfolio vs Benchmark (2)
Hsu Lo
Excess Return Factors Decomposition Expected Return Analysis For Portfolio 2
Stock Selection
Factor
Asset Allocation Factor Total Return Factors Total
Stock Selection Dynamic Asset
Allocation
Static Asset Allo-
cation
Total Asset Allo-
cation
Total Excess Re-
turn
Active Compo-
nent
Active Compo-
nent
Expected Total
Return
UK Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.000% 0.75% 0.750% 0.7500% 0.000% 7.200% 7.200%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Japanese Equity
1st Quarter 0.0000% 0.000% 0.75% 0.750% 0.7500% 0.000% 0.800% 0.800%
2nd Quarter
3rd Quarter
Total Portfolio 0.000% 0.000% 1.500% 1.500% 1.500% 0.000% 8.000% 8.000%
15
1.3. LITERATURE REVIEW
1.3.3 Geometric excess return
Geometric excess return is the ratio of one plus the portfolio net return divided by one plus the net
benchmark return minus one. It measures how much better the manager did than the benchmark
as a percentage of the final value of the initial amount invested in the benchmark. The key rule
for the geometric excess return model is that the product of different attribution effects must equal
the geometric excess return. Further, for multi-periods of time, the product of different attribution
effects over time must be equal to the geometric excess return over the total period of time.
Geometric excess return has several advantages compared to arithmetic excess return: (i) Geo-
metric excess returns are easy to do compounding for in multi-period models and do not encounter
the linking problem of the arithmetic model, (ii) geometric excess returns are not affected by the
currency effect, (iii) since the geometric excess is a percentage relative to benchmark, when the
market performs poorly, geometric excess return is much more impressive than when the market is
bullish.
A summary on the fund performance attribution analysis can be found in Bacon [7], Morningstar
[51] and Morningstar [52].
1.3.4 Factor Attribution Analysis
Factor attribution analysis is another way to decompose and explain the fund return. It could also
help the investors to better understand the key factors who drive the fund return and the fund’s
exposures to different types of risk. Sharpe [62] introduced the Capital Asset Pricing Model which
describes the return of a portfolio or a stock as a linear relation between the excess return and its
systematic (market) risk. The drawback of CAPM is that it only includes one risk factor, i.e., the
risk from the whole market, which may not be the best way to explain the returns, especially when
the portfolio is constructed with multiple strategies in mind. Fama and French [28] proposed a
three-factor attribution model to describe the stock return with two additional factors: the exposure
to small caps and the exposure to high book-to-market ratio. The three-factor attribution model
better explains the portfolio returns than the traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model. Carhart [18]
added a fourth factor, called the momentum factor, to extend the Fama-French three-factor model
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in order to capture momentum returns.
Funds are exposed to different types of risks based on their strategy. For equity mutual funds,
the standard style attribution analysis is similar to that in the Fama-French three-factor model or
Carhart four-factor model. Fung and Hsieh [29] and Fung and Hsieh [30] proposed an asset-based
style analysis for analyzing hedge funds. The asset-based style analysis approach is to find the
common sources of risk in the returns and link these common risks to observable prices. If the
common sources of risk cannot be linked to marketable prices, the factors are called return-based
style factors. The authors studied four different types of hedge funds: Trend-Following funds,
Merger Arbitrage Funds, Fixed-Income Hedge Funds and Equity Long-Short Hedge Funds, and
summarized seven risk factors. These seven factors are market risk, spread between small-cap
stock returns, spread between large-cap stock returns, 10-year Treasury yield, yield spread between
10 year T-bonds and Moody’s Baa bonds, trend following bond, currency and commodity factors.
Agarwal et al. [3], Agarwal and Naik [2] and Jaeger and Wagner [40] performed similar studies
on different types of hedge funds as well. Okunev and White [56] also suggested ten categories of
potential market factor pool which investors could consider using as regression factors. The factor
attribution analysis approach is highly dependent on choosing the right factors. Researchers usually
use principal component analysis or stepwise linear regression to select the factors which have the
most explanation power. The K-factor linear model is based on the assumption that the factors are
stationary. The K-factor attribution analysis usually achieves high in-sample R2, but often results
in poor out-of-sample fit.
Katsaris et al. [43] proposed an approach to incorporate the investor’s qualitative analysis into
quantitative factor model. They showed that combining the investor’s understanding of a fund’s
strategy with traditional out of sample statistic criteria could lead to a more robust linear factor
model. The market risk model is adjusted with the residue risk and tail risk to better fit the true
return distribution. The out of sample explanation power R2 is used as the weighting parameter
in the factor to correct the deviation of the expected return from the actual return. In addition,
the author proposed an approach to quantify the factors such as liquidity risk, leverage risk and
concentration in the size in the tail risk based on the investor’s qualitative analysis.
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1.3.5 Portfolio Optimization and Risk Management
Risk measures such as variance, mean absolute deviation, downside standard deviation, Value at
Risk (VaR), Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) and tail conditional expectation (TCE) are powerful
risk management tools applied in portfolio optimization.
Markowitz [48] proposed the ground-breaking Modern Portfolio Theory, but it is not exten-
sively used in large scale portfolio construction in its original form because it suffers from several
limitations. First, it requires several strong assumptions such as: (a) asset returns are (jointly) nor-
mally distributed random variables, (b) correlations between assets are fixed and constant over time.
Second, the optimal allocation is very sensitive to the inputs. Third, it encounters computation dif-
ficulties for large scale portfolio optimization because it requires solving a large-scale quadratic
programming problem with dense covariance matrix.
Comparing to the traditional mean-variance approach which uses a complete set of expected
return as inputs, Black and Litterman [14] proposed a scheme to incorporate the investor’s view in
the equilibrium market to produce a new set of expected returns. This allows the optimal portfolio
weights to reflect the investor’s views. The degree of uncertainty regarding different views is also
considered in the model. The Black-Litterman asset allocation model has gained wide acceptance
in financial institutions.
Konno and Yamazaki [45] proposed an alternative Mean-Absolute Deviation (MAD) model
which removes the normality assumption of asset return. Mean absolute deviation is used as the
risk measure in the model instead of variance. MAD is easier to compute comparing to the original
Markowitz model because it uses the L1 risk function which removes the computational difficulties
associated with the covariance matrix in the portfolio variance model.
Value-at-Risk (VaR) is another way to measure downside risk. It was first proposed by J.P.
Morgan Chase Co. in RiskMetricsTM [59] as a measure of acceptability for a financial position
with random return. It is also part of current regulatory frameworks for banks [65]. However,
VaR is subject to several serious limitations as well. In particular, it is not a coherent measure
because of its lack of sub-additivity (Artzner et al. [6]). VaR is a nonsmooth, nonconvex, and multi-
extreme function [49] and results in intractable non-convex stochastic optimization problems both
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in the context of minimizing VaR or minimizing a convex function with VaR constraint. Extensive
research efforts have focused on portfolio optimization with VaR. Examples related to solving the
VaR optimization problem include Basak and Shapiro [8], Benati and Rizzi [12], Campbell et al.
[17], Campbell et al. [17], Gaivoronski and Pflug [32], Natarajan et al. [54], Pang and Leyffer [57],
Pirvu [58], Tasche and Tibiletti [66] and Wozabal et al. [71]. More generally, in quantile based
risk management, Rodriguez [61] showed that the quantile based portfolio optimization problem
could be solved by using Brute-Force Method, Greedy Linear and Mixed Integer Programming
techniques. Cetinkaya and Thiele [21] proposed a fast-convergent approximation method for the
portfolio management problem with a quantile criterion which is computationally tractable.
Rockafellar and Uryasev [60] proposed the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) risk measure and
showed that it is a coherent risk measure [6]. They also obtained a linear programming formulation
to solve the mean-CVaR problem efficiently. Acerbi [1] showed that the portfolio risk which was
given by the spectral risk measure could always be formulated as an linear programming problem
and CVaR can be viewed as a special case of spectral risk measure. However, Alexander et al.
[4] showed that the resulting linear problem was very ill-conditioned when the risk-return had a
non-linear structure, and was hard to solve when the number of scenarios became large. Lim et al.
[46] pointed out that although CVaR was very important both from a theoretical (coherent measure)
and practical perspective, it is fragile in optimization. Ceria et al. [20] showed that one way to
solve the fragility was to impose spectral risk constraints with several different risk models at the
same time. However, this multi-spectral risk constraints model increased the size of the resulting
LP significantly.
Although linear programming formulations can be solved very efficiently in CPLEX and MOSEK
even when the problem is of large scale, the efficiency of the algorithms depends significantly on
the sparsity of the problem. However, the LP derived from CVaR minimization has a large dense
block and the problem is very ill-conditioned. Another drawback is that CVaR optimization usually
results in an infinite number of portfolios with the same VaR and CVaR.
Alexander et al. [4] not only showed the ill-conditioning of the CVaR optimization problem,
but also proposed a smoothing scheme to minimize CVaR very efficiently by approximating the
piecewise linear CVaR objective function with a continuously differentiable piecewise quadratic
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approximation function. The linear programming CVaR optimization problem then turned out to
become a continuous piecewise quadratic convex programming problem. This quadratic convex
programming problem typically generated an infinite sequence of approximations converging to a
solution. At each iteration, it typically required a function and a gradient evaluation. This smoothing
method speeded up solution time by 1187% comparing to the linear programming structure. The
relative difference in objective function is less than 1.5%. Iyengar and Ma [39] developed fast
gradient descent algorithm based on the smoothing method proposed by Nesterov [55] to iteratively
compute approximate solutions for the large scale scenario-based mean-CVaR portfolio selection
problem without requiring any linear programming and can guarantee an accuracy with  ≈ 10−3.
The fast gradient descent algorithm included two steps: (1) smoothing the objective by imposing
a strongly convex function and (2) update the weights using a convex combination of two other
variables.
1.3.6 Robust Portfolio Optimization and Control
Robust optimization deals with uncertainty by allowing parameters to vary in a certain convex un-
certainty set and optimizing the worst case over that set. The robust optimization problem is usually
set up in a min-max or max-min framework. For a comprehensive summary of this topic, the reader
is referred to Ben-Tal et al. [11], Bertsimas et al. [13] and Ben-Tal et al. [10]. An overview of the
most recent developments in robust optimization can be found in Gabrel et al. [31].
Traditional mean-variance models are vulnerable to data errors. Extensive research on protect-
ing portfolios against worst-case estimates have been presented in, for instance, Ben-Tal et al. [10]
and Goldfarb and Iyengar [34]. Portfolio optimization with uncertainty over a set of distributions
has also been intensively studied. For example, ElGhaoui et al. [27] proposed a robust portfolio
framework which assumed that only the bounds on the parameters are known. The author solved
the worst-case problem with semi-definite programming and showed dramatic improvement of the
worst-case objective of the robust portfolio. DeMiguel and Nogales [24] proposed a class of port-
folios that were less sensitive to data error than the Mean-Variance portfolio selection model. A
robust estimator was used in the model and a single nonlinear program was solved. Glasserman and
Xu [33] considered that the asset returns were driven by market factors that evolved stochastically.
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Both the relationship between returns and factors and the evolution of the factors were subject to
model error and treated robustly stochastically. The authors developed robust portfolio control rules
by applying stochastic factor in model dynamics.
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Chapter 2
Robust Portfolio Management with
Uncertainty in Asset Allocation
2.1 Motivation
Institutional investors, such as pension funds, university endowments and insurance companies,
actively manage their portfolio by investing money in outside fund managers with expectation of
generating superior returns while keeping risk in a low level. Fund managers might have quiet
different risk and return profiles with regarding to their strategy and investment process. Institu-
tional investor has low tolerance for risk in nature. A thorough understanding of the fund manager’s
sources of returns and risks inherent in the decision process and selecting superior external man-
agers is critical to the performance of the institutional investor’s portfolio.
Manager’s asset allocation could significantly change fund’s exposures and affect fund’s return
and risk as a result. Previous research focused on evaluating fund manager’s skills by decompos-
ing return into several attributions. For instance, Lo [47] and Hsu and Myers [38] propose to split
fund return into active management component (reflecting the fund manager’s skill) and a passive
management component (reflecting stock performance). Brinson et al. [16] proposed a method to
decompose the manager’s added value 1) Asset Allocation, 2) Stock Selection and 3) Intersection
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between the two. These approaches offer investor an effective way to evaluate and select single
superior fund manager.
In this Chapter, considering the low risk tolerance for institutional investors, our goal is to con-
struct a portfolio as an institutional investor by selecting multiple superior fund managers, in order
to minimize the worst case volatility while keeping the return beating certain benchmark. Asset
allocation acts as an important role in fund’s performance and may varies from time to time. Un-
certainty in return has been well studied in the context of portfolio management, but not for asset
allocation in fund management. In this Chapter, we propose a new framework which extends tradi-
tional mean-variance model and takes into account the uncertainty in fund’s asset allocation in the
decision process. We also propose an efficient algorithm to solve the model by either transforming
the inner global optimization problem to a series of Mixed Integer linear problem, or deploying the
algorithm developed by Chen and Burer [22]. The result shows that uncertainly in manager’s asset
allocation does affect portfolio’s variance and stability. Our robust model provides a consistent and
strong protection under the worst case manager’s asset allocation.
KeyContribution : In this Chaper we propose a robust framework that takes into account the
uncertainty stemming from the asset allocation, in the context of manager selection and portfolio
management. We assume that only bounds on fund manager’s asset allocation are available. We
define the worst-case risk as the largest variance attainable, with limited information on each fund
manager’s asset allocation. We propose two exact approaches and an hubristic one to solve the
problem efficiently. Furthermore, we show that our robust model provides a consistent and strong
protection than nominal model under the worst case manager’s asset allocation.
2.2 Robust Fund Manager Selection
2.2.1 Problem Setup
We aim to select several fund managers which are different in asset allocation but with same in-
vestment strategy or theme, in order to minimize the worst case portfolio risk (variance), while
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guaranteeing that expected return beats certain benchmark and all the money must be invested.
Each manager’s asset allocation is under uncertainty and is bounded in certain range. We will use
the following notation:
Decision Variable
xi: allocation to fund manager i;
Parameters under Uncertainty
wij : allocation to asset j of manager i;
w+ij : upper bound of allocation to asset j of manager i;
w−ij : lower bound of allocation to asset j of manager i;
wij : nominal allocation to asset j of manager i;
Other Parameters
n: number of candidate fund managers;
m: number of asset classes;
r¯j : expected return from asset j;
τ : portfolio return benchmark.
2.2.2 Problem without Uncertainty
We apply the classical Markowitz portfolio optimization model to fund manager selection problem.
minx
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wij
n∑
k=1
xk
m∑
l=1
wkl cov(rj , rl) (2.1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj ≥ τ
xi ≥ 0,∀i
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2.2.3 Problem with Uncertainty
For each fund manager, their allocation to different asset class might change from time to time, but
is subject to certain range. Changes of allocation directly impact their return and risk. We aim to
minimize the worst case portfolio variance by taking the consideration that asset allocation is under
uncertainty for each manager.
minx maxω
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wij
n∑
k=1
xk
m∑
l=1
wkl cov(rj , rl) (2.2)
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij ,∀i, j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj ≥ τ
2.3 Solution Approach
One of the traditional approaches to solve the robust optimization problem is to reformulate the inner
problem as its dual and solve with the outer problem. However, in our case, the inner maximization
problem is a non-convex problem which has multiple local maximizers, and leads computational
difficulty to solve with its dual formulation.
We propose two algorithms to solve the inner problem, and then solve the outer problem by
adding delayed constraints until the solution converge. The first approach to solve the inner problem
is to eliminate the quadratic term in the objective function through linearization, and transform the
problem into a mixed 0-1 linear program. The second approach is to deploy Chen and Burer [22]’s
algorithm to solve the nonconvex quadratic problem globally via completely positive programming.
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2.3.1 Inner Problem
Approach 1
Theorem 2.1 Tuy [70] A convex function attains its maximum on a simplex at a vertex of this
simplex.
Theorem 2.2 Tuy [70] A vertex of a polyhedron in the hyperplane is a point x0 such that, for a
certain positive integer I, x0i = x−i or x+i for i 6= I .
Let Ji be the index of j of the inactive wij for manager i and denote wij = w−ij + 4wijuij ,
where4wij = w+ij − w−ij . Then for each manager i,
• for j = Ji, wij ∈ (w−ij , w+ij), i.e. wij = w−ij +4wijuij , where 0 ≤ uij ≤ 1
• for j 6= Ji, wij = w−ij or w+ij , i.e. wij = w−ij +4wijuij , where uij ∈ {0, 1}
In this way, we could enumerate Ji from 1 to m for wij with regards to each manager i and
the original inner nonconvex problem could be reformulated to mn mixed integer subproblems. For
certain subproblem,
maxω
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
m∑
l=1
xixkcov(rj , rl)(w−ij +4wijuij)(w−kl +4wklukl) (2.3)
s.t. uij ∈ {0, 1}, for j 6= Ji
0 ≤ uij ≤ 1, for j = Ji
Sherali and Adams [64] proposed RLT inequalities which are derived using a so-called Reformulation-
Linearisation Technique. The constraint yij = xixj , together with the bounds 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 and
0 ≤ xj ≤ 1, implies the following four linear inequalities
yij ≥ 0, yij ≤ xi, yij ≤ xj , yij ≥ xi + xj − 1. (2.4)
By means of linearisation, the problem could be further simplified as mn linear mixed integer
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subproblems. Substituting uijukl with vijkl, problem (2.3) could be reformulated as following:
maxω
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
m∑
l=1
xixkcov(rj , rl)
(
w−ijw
−
kl + 2w
−
kl 4 wijuij +4wij 4 wklvijkl
)
(2.5)
s.t. vijkl ≤ uij ,∀i, j
vijkl ≤ ukl,∀k, l
vijkl ≥ uij + ukl − 1,∀i, j, k, l
uij ∈ {0, 1}, for j 6= Ji
0 ≤ uij ≤ 1, for j = Ji
Approach 2
Chen and Burer [22] proposed a new method for solving nonconvex quadratic programming to
global optimality via completely positive programming. Their approach is to employ a finite branch-
and bound (B&B) scheme, in which branching is based on the first-order KKT conditions and
polyhedral-semidominant relaxation are solved at each node of the (B&B) tree. The relaxations are
derived from completely positive and doubly nonnegative programs. The original quadratic program
is reformulated as a quadratic program with linear equality, nonnegativity and complimentarily
constraints. Such problem could be further reformulated as completely positive programming and
relaxed in a natural way to a doubly nonnegative program.
2.3.2 Outer Problem
Taking the optimal solution get from the inner problem as parameters for the outer problem and
adding delayed constraints, the outer problem could be treated as a traditional convex problem with
linear constraints.
For the Sth iteration, the outer problem with two new delayed constraints could be formulated
as
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min z
s.t. z ≥
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wsij
n∑
k=1
xk
m∑
l=1
wskl cov(rj , rl), ∀s = 1, 2, ...S (2.6)
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wsijrj ≥ τ,∀s = 1, 2, ...S
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
2.3.3 Algorithm
Step 1 Start with a feasible solution x ∈ X and set iteration number , s = 0.
Step 2 Solve the inner problem with candidate solution xs and obtain a optimal solution w,
namely ws+1.
Step 3 Solve the outer problem 2.6 for xs+1, and set s = s+ 1.
Step 4 Repeat Steps 2 and 3 until the algorithm generates the same two candidate solutions
x ∈ X in two consecutive iterations.
2.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we present three experiments to illustrate our robust solution of manager selection
problem with uncertainty in asset allocations. The first set of experiment is to compare the per-
formance of the two approaches proposed in Section 4. The second experiment is to compare our
robust approach with the nominal approach from the standpoint of the risk. In the third experi-
ment, we propose an heuristic algorithm by only taking several managers from the large candidate
manager pool into the robust manager selection model, and we compare the results of this heuristic
method with the two approaches we proposed in Section 4.
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2.4.1 Compare the computational results of two approaches
In this set of experiment, we test the efficiency of the two approaches, the MIP approach and Chen
and Burer [22] approach. We test three instances: four managers with four assets, six managers with
six assets, and twelve managers with six assets. We observe that the first approach is more efficient
than the second one, when the problem size is small. However, as the problem size goes large, the
computational advantage of the second approach becomes more obvious. As the size goes to twelve
managers with six assets, the first approach needs to solve 612 independent mixed integer problem
which leads the problem runs forever. The second approach could solve the problem in a reasonable
time for this size. Table 2.1 to table 2.5 present the experiment result for comparing interest.
Four Managers with Four Assets
Table 2.1: Four Managers with Four Assets
worst variance nominal return 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
Manager 1 13.2566 0.0259 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 2 10.161 0.0227 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 3 11.2965 0.0457 0 0 0 0.17 0.4368 0.7 0.9632
Manager 4 7.645 0.0267 1 1 1 0.83 0.5632 0.3 0.0368
variance(objective) 7.645 7.645 7.645 7.93 8.6456 9.6935 11.0762
excess return 0.0117 0.0067 0.0017 0 0 0 0
Running Time (Approach 1) 8.092 7.222 7.294 9.96 16.394 13.791 15.745
Running Time (Approach 2) 13.274 12.95 15.055 25.6 27.134 26.487 44.493
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Six Manager with Six Assets
Table 2.2: Six Manager with Six Assets
worst variance nominal return 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
Manager 1 7.1842 0.0461 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4937 0.3524 0.1778 0.0158
Manager 2 6.4727 0.0341 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5063 0.3593 0.2284 0.0915
Manager 3 7.5552 0.0432 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 4 9.6658 0.0506 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 5 7.8224 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2883 0.5937 0.8927
Manager 6 10.3974 0.0525 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
variance(objective) 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2145 6.4857 6.9147 7.4998
excess return 0.0242 0.0192 0.0142 0.0092 0.0042 0 0 0 0
Running
time
(Approach 1) 25768 26467 26218 26423 26487 26407 26672 15859 28566
Running
time
(Approach 2) 6848 7167 7152 7242 7258 6870 9594 13233 16236
Table 2.3 and 2.4 shows running time with respect to various range of uncertainty of manager’s asset
allocation. The first row is the running time of the original setting. The second row and the third
row expand the range by 10% and 20% of the nominal manager’s asset allocation, respectively.
Under both four managers with four assets case and six managers with six assets case, running
time increases as the range of the manager’s asset allocation gets wider. In addition, running time
increases as benchmark return increases as well.
Table 2.3: Running time comparison (in seconds)
0.01 0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04
original bound 13 13 15 26 27 26 44
10% wider 28 46 57 55 59 66 73
20% wider 45 76 75 83 82 97 104
Table 2.4: Running time comparison (in seconds)
0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055
original bound 6848 7167 7152 7242 7258 6870 9594 13233 16236
10% wider 8470 8566 8512 8559 8700 8471 12124 18470 21184
20% wider 10147 10519 10742 10408 10548 10523 18345 22327 25343
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Twelve Managers with Six Assets
Table 2.5: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
worst vari-
ance
nominal
re-
turn
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6
Manager 1 8.921 0.0526 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 2 9.1132 0.0415 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 3 11.306 0.0461 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 4 8.9833 0.059 0 0 0 0 0 0.2253 0.431 0.622 0.8118 0.4923
Manager 5 7.6327 0.0316 0.6421 0.6421 0.6421 0.6421 0.6212 0.4865 0.3427 0.1858 0.0274 0
Manager 6 10.2603 0.0667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0005 0 0 0.4042
Manager 7 10.3677 0.029 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 8 8.8524 0.0201 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 9 9.9881 0.0145 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 10 10.031 0.0386 0.3468 0.3469 0.3468 0.3468 0.3051 0.2664 0.2258 0.1922 0.1608 0.1035
Manager 11 7.9499 0.031 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Manager 12 8.885 0.0494 0.0111 0.011 0.0111 0.0111 0.0736 0.0218 0 0 0 0
variance(objective) 6.8357 6.8357 6.8357 6.8357 6.8387 6.975 7.2184 7.6183 8.1685 8.9515
excess return 0.0192 0.0142 0.0092 0.0042 0 0 0 0 0 0
Running
time
30719 30599 29864 30553 31039 54754 55120 57464 48503 27397
2.4.2 Compare the robust model with the nominal model
In this set of experiment, we compare our robust model with the nominal model. We test the
performance of the two models under the nominal asset allocation scenario and the worst case
asset allocation scenario. We also compare the difference in manager selection policy under the
two models. The six managers with six assets case and twelve managers with six assets case are
presented for illustration purpose.
Six Managers with Six Assets
Figure 2.1 and figure 2.2 compare the optimal manager selection policy under robust model and
nominal model. Under nominal model, Manager 1 is always chosen under all benchmark require-
ment, but with a decreasing weight as benchmark return increases. Manager 5 is selected and takes
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an increasing weight in the portfolio as benchmark return exceed 0.045. However, under the robust
model, manager 1 takes much less weight in the portfolio comparing with its weight in the nominal
model. Manager 2, who is never selected in the nominal model, gains a larger weight under the
robust manager selection policy.
Figure 2.3 presents the risk under the nominal model, robust model and the case where the nom-
inal manager allocation is applied when the worst case manager’s allocation occurs. The nominal
model always gives the lowest risk with manager’s nominal asset allocation. The robust model de-
livers manager selection policy and the minimum risk with the worst case manager’s nominal asset
allocation. In the scenario that the worst case manager’s asset allocation occurs, nominal manager
selection policy consistently results in a higher risk than the risk under the robust manager selection
policy. From figure 2.3, we could see that the robust model provides a good protection with the
worst case scenario.
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Figure 2.1: Nominal Manager Allocation: Six Managers with Six Assets
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Figure 2.2: Robust Manager Allocation: Six Managers with Six Assets
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Figure 2.3: Nominal Model v.s. Robust Model: Six Managers with Six Assets
In addition, we test the out of sample return by taking the robust manager selection policy and
nominal manager selection policy for the six managers with six assets case. Figure 2.4 and figure
2.5 take the manager selection policy when the benchmark return is set by 0.15% and 0.45% using
historical data, but apply the most recent 24 months manager’s return. The portfolio expected return
of the out of sample data is lower than the benchmark return set in the model, since we are using
out of sample data, which is different from the historical one. From the figure, we can see that the
robust manager selection policy yields a lower expected return than nominal selection policy, but it
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also avoid significant downside risk.
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Figure 2.5: Out of Sample Robust Portfolio Return v.s. Nominal Portfolio Return 2
Twelve Managers with six Assets
Figure 2.6 demonstrates that the nominal model offers a lower risk under nominal allocation than
the robust model, which is to minimize the worst case risk. However the robust model performs a
stronger and consistent protection on the risk given the worst case asset allocation scenario.
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From manager selection viewpoint, the robust model and the nominal model also result in very
different selection policies. Manager 12, Manager 4 and Manager 10, who take a large weight under
robust manager selection policy, are never chosen under the nominal manager selection policy.
Meanwhile, Manager 1 and Manager 8 are never selected under robust manager selection policy.
Detailed manager allocation information are showed in figure 2.7 and figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.6: Nominal Model v.s. Robust Model: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
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Figure 2.7: Nominal Manager Allocation:Twelve Managers with Six Assets
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Figure 2.8: Robust Manager Allocation:Twelve Managers with Six Assets
2.4.3 An Heuristic Method
We define ”the worst case efficient managers” as managers whose worst case risk v.s. nominal re-
turn dominate other managers and they also lie on the boundary of the convex hull which is compose
of all other manager’s worst case risk v.s. nominal return profile. In the heuristic method, only the
worst case efficient managers will be selected in model in order to accelerate solving the problem.
In the four managers with four assets case, manager 3 and manager 4 dominate other man-
agers from worst case risk v.s. nominal return viewpoint. In the six managers with six assets case,
manager 1, manager 2 and manager 5 are on the boundary of the convex hull including all other
manager’s worst case risk v.s. nominal return profile. In the twelve managers with six assets case,
manager 4, manager 5 and manager 6 are defined as ”the worst case efficient managers” as they
do not only dominate other managers in the standpoint of worst case risk v.s. nominal return, but
also lie on the boundary of the convex hull of all other managers. Manager 1 (marked as circle)
and manager 12 (marked as cross) are not defined as ”the worst case efficient manager” and are not
selected in the heuristic method because they do not lie on the boundary of the convex hull, although
no single manager dominates these two from worst case risk v.s. nominal return aspect.
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For the cases of four managers with four assets, and six managers with six assets, table 2.6 and
table 2.7 compare the result of optimal manager selection policy and the running time which get
from the heuristic method with the result gets from the two approaches proposed in Section 4. The
heuristic method results in the same optimal result as the other two approaches, but with significantly
less time to solve the problem due to less candidate managers, especially for six managers with six
assets instance. Efficient frontier got from the heuristic method also overlaps the one with other
approaches as shown in figure 2.9 and figure 2.10.
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Figure 2.9: Efficient Frontier: Four Managers with Four Assets
Table 2.6: Heuristic Method v.s. Other Methods: Four Managers with Four Assets
worst variance nominal return 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
Manager 3 11.2965 0.0457 0 0 0 0.1737 0.4368 0.7 0.9632
Manager 4 7.645 0.0267 1 1 1 0.8263 0.5632 0.3 0.0368
variance(objective) 7.645 7.645 7.645 7.9324 8.6456 9.6935 11.0762
Running Time 9.36 10.43 11.07 12.01 12.02 12.82 13.37
With Four Manager
variance(objective) 7.645 7.645 7.645 7.9324 8.6456 9.6935 11.0762
Running time (Approach 1) 8.092 7.222 7.294 9.957 16.394 13.791 15.745
Running time (Approach 2) 13.274 12.95 15.055 25.636 27.134 26.487 44.493
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Figure 2.10: Efficient Frontier: Six Managers with Six Assets
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Table 2.7: Heuristic Method v.s. Other Methods: Six Managers with Six Assets
worst vari-
ance
nominal
return
0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55
Manager 1 7.1842 0.0461 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4303 0.4937 0.3524 0.1778 0.0158
Manager 2 6.4727 0.0341 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5697 0.5063 0.3593 0.2284 0.0915
Manager 5 7.8224 0.0573 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2883 0.5937 0.8927
variance(objective) 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2028 6.2145 6.4857 6.9147 7.4998
Running time 42 100 38 58 36 44 36 65 99
With Six Managers
Running time (Approach1) 25768 26467 26218 26423 26487 26407 26672 15859 28566
Running time (Approach2) 6848 7167 7152 7242 7258 6870 9594 13233 16236
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For the twelve managers with six assets case, manager 4, manager 5, and manager 6 are se-
lected as the worst case efficient managers in the heuristic algorithm. Candidate managers are
reduced from twelve to three, and running time are dropped significantly. However, the heuristic
method yields a larger worst case variance comparing to the other two approaches. The difference
is diminished as the benchmark return got large, which is as shown in figure 2.12.
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Table 2.8: Heuristic Method v.s. Other Methods: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
worst vari-
ance
nominal
return
0.015 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.035 0.04 0.045 0.05 0.055 0.06 0.065
Manager 4 8.9833 0.059 0.8692 0.8693 0.8693 0.8693 0.8698 0.6927 0.5109 0.3291 0.1473 0 0
Manager 5 7.6327 0.0316 0.1308 0.1307 0.1307 0.1307 0.1302 0.3073 0.4891 0.6709 0.8527 0.875 0.2171
Manager 6 10.2603 0.0667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.125 0.7829
variance(objective) 7.5945 7.5945 7.5945 7.5945 7.5945 7.6518 7.8306 8.1309 8.5538 9.1266 9.9577
Running time 162 74 79 92 90 117 90 152 186 29 17
With Twelve Managers
variance(objective) 6.8357 6.8357 6.8357 6.8357 6.8387 6.975 7.2184 7.6183 8.1685 8.9515 9.8855
Running time (Approach2) 30719 30599 29864 30553 31039 54754 55120 57464 48503 27397 1660
41
2.5. CONCLUSIONS
6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10.5 11 11.50.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Risk
Be
nc
hm
ar
k 
R
et
ur
n
Efficient Frontier: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
 
 
Manager 4
Manager 5
Manager 6
With Twelve Managers
With Three Most Efficient Managers
Figure 2.11: Efficient Frontier: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
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Figure 2.12: Error with Heuristic Method: Twelve Managers with Six Assets
2.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we proposed a robust framework that takes into account the uncertainty stemming
from the asset allocation, in the context of manager selection and portfolio management. We also
proposed two exact approaches and an heuristic one to solve the problem efficiently. In addition,
our robust model provides a consistent and strong protection under the worst case manager’s asset
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allocation.
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Chapter 3
Robust Portfolio Management with
Uncertainty in Asset Allocation and
Asset Return
3.1 Motivation
Active management aims to generate superior return by actively changing the weight of securities
or asset classes. It has been criticized for delivering lower return than passive management in
recent years. Passive management is only subject to uncertainty in assert return, however, active
management is subject to uncertainty from two resources: 1) asset allocation, and 2) asset return. In
this research, we study how uncertainty in both asset allocation and asset return affect the portfolio
return. In addition, we apply robust optimization approach to protect the worst case scenario.
Portfolio optimization problem is developed by Markowitz [48] decades ago to study the trade
off between portfolio’s return and variance. This framework is decent in theoretical point of view,
but lack of practical value. One of the criticism of the model is that the return of securities is
assumed to be normal distributed, which is not the case in reality. The second criticism is that the
input has to be very accurately estimated, since the output is very sensitive to the input. However,
this is very difficult for expected return estimate.
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Mordern robust optimization approach is first introduced by El-Ghaoui and Lebret [26] and
Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [9], which allow the robust version to be applied to the classical portfolio
optimization model. The robust approach uses the distribution from the estimation process to find a
robust portfolio in one single optkmizaiotn process. The resulting portfolio is more robust in terms
of less sensitive to the input estimate error, and performs better than the classic optimization model.
In Dong and Thiele [25], we studied how uncertainty stemming from manager’s asset allocation
affects manager selection policy. In this Chapter, we consider the uncertainty in asset allocation and
asset return together in our manager selection process and we developed a new robust framework to
protect the worst case return.
Key Contribution: Uncertainty in asset return has been well studied in portfolio management.
In this Chapter, we investigate two sources of uncertainty stemming from manager’s asset allocation
and asset return in the context of manager selection. Uncertainty of manager’s asset allocation is
defined through bounds. Uncertainty in asset return is controlled through bounds and uncertainty
budget level. We proposed a robust framework to protect the worst case return. Furthermore, we
investigate the property of the lower bound and upper bound of the problem. Two approaches are
investigated through the special structure of the problem to solve the problem efficiently.
3.2 Robust Fund Manager Selection
3.2.1 Problem Setup
As an institutional investor, our goal is to select several fund managers to protect against the worst
case return scenario. The candidate managers invest in the same asset class but different in asset
allocation based on their views of the market. Our portfolio are facing two source of uncertainties
varied by each manager: the uncertainty in asset allocation and uncertainty from the asset return. We
assume that only limited information of asset allocation are disclosed to the investor. The bounds
on manager’s asset allocation for each assert class are available. The uncertainty in asset return is
also depicted as bounds in our set up. But uncertainty budget for the asset return limits the variation
of return, which prevent the return of all asset class go to the worst case, which is highly unlikely.
We consider two cases in our model: 1) no constraint on the benchmark return, 2) with constraint
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on the benchmark return. We first present the framework of the nominal model without uncertainty
in Section 2.2, and then present the two versions robust model in Section 2.3-2.4. We use the
following notations for our problem setup:
Decision Variables
xi: allocation in fund manager i
Parameters related to fund managers’ allocations
wij : (uncertain) allocation of manager i in asset j
w+ij : upper bound of allocation of manager i in asset j
w−ij : lower bound of allocation of manager i to asset j
wij : nominal allocation of manager i to asset j
rj : (uncertain) return of asset j
r+j : upper bound of return of asset j
r−j : lower bound of return of asset j
rj : nominal return of asset j
rˆj : deviation of return of asset j
zj : random variable, zj = (rj − r¯j)/rˆj
Other parameters
n: number of fund managers
m: number of asset classes
cov(rj , rl) : covariance between the returns of asset j and asset l
τ : portfolio return benchmark
α: uncertainty budget of asset return
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3.2.2 Problem without Uncertainty
We use the simplest portfolio model as the start. In this model, we aim to maximize the portfolio
return.
maxx∈X
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
w¯ij r¯j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
3.2.3 Problem with Uncertainty
We consider two sources of uncertainty from the fund manager asset allocation and asset return
together in our framework. We allow uncertainty in assert allocation varies freely because it is fully
charged by fund manager. On the other hand, we set up uncertainty budget on asset return, since it
is highly unlikely that all asset class go to the worst case. The reason the diversification is to use
one asset class to hedge the loss in another asset class when the market is under sever headwinds.
in our experiment, we do conclude the case which full uncertainty budget in used to see the pattern
of manager selection policy. The robust model is set up as following:
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maxx∈X min(r,ω)∈S
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
rj = r¯j + rˆjzj ,∀j
m∑
j=1
|zj | ≤ α
−1 ≤ zj ≤ 1,∀j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
Considering that short sale is not allowed for fund manager, i.e. w−ij ≥ 0, the problem be could
reformulated as
maxx∈X min(r,ω)∈S
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
rj = r¯j − rˆjzj ,∀j
m∑
j=1
zj ≤ α
0 ≤ zj ≤ 1, ∀j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
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We proposed two problems to test the robust framework in the context of manager selection
problem
1) without return benchmark, and
2) with return benchmark constraint
For each of the problem, we compare the result of the robust structure with the nominal model.
3.2.4 Without return benchmark
maxx∈X min(r,ω)∈S
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
rj = r¯j − rˆjzj , ∀j
m∑
j=1
zj ≤ α
0 ≤ zj ≤ 1, ∀j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
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3.2.5 With return benchmark constraint
maxx∈X min(r,ω)∈S
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
rj = r¯j − rˆjzj , ∀j
m∑
j=1
zj ≤ α
0 ≤ zj ≤ 1, ∀j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
w¯ij r¯j ≥ τ
xi ≥ 0,∀i
3.3 Benchmark Problem
In this section, we present two sets of benchmark problems. The first set is that only uncertainty in
w is considered in the problem, and the second set is that both w and r are takes as their nominal
value.
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3.3.1 Benchmark Problem 1
In this benchmark problem, we only consider uncertainty in asset allocation and use the estimate
expected return as the input in the model.
maxx∈X min(r,ω)∈S
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wij r¯j
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1, ∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
In this case, the inner problem is a linear problem instead of a bilinear problem. In order to
solve this problem, we write the dual of the inner problem and cooperate with the outer problem.
The problem can be reformulate as
maxx,t,u,v
n∑
i=1
ti +
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
w+ijuij −
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
w−ijvij
s.t. ti + uij − vij ≤ xir¯j ,∀i, j
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i = 1, 2, .., n
uij ≤ 0,∀i, j
vij ≤ 0,∀i, j
Property: The problem is independent in terms of i, for each sub-problem i, at optimality, we
know that vij = 0 or uij = 0, such that the problem could be reformulated as
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maxt,u,v ti +
m∑
j=1
(
w+ijmin{0, xir¯j + vij − ti} − w−ijmin{0,−xir¯j − uij + ti}
)
maxt,u,v ti +
m∑
j=1
(
w+ijmin{0, xir¯j − ti} − w−ijmin{0,−xir¯j + ti}
)
We can rank xir¯j , and the problem becomes a piecewise linear problem for each sub-problem
i? then the problem can be reformulated as
maxt,u,v ti +
k∑
j=1
(
w+ij(xir¯j − ti)
)
−
m∑
j=k+1
(
w−ij(ti − xir¯)
)
and the slope of ti is 1−
∑k
j=1w
+
ij−
∑m
j=k+1w
−
ij . When k = 0, then the slope is 1−
∑m
j=1w
−
ij ≥
0, while when k = m+ 1, the slope is 1−∑mj=1w+ij ≤ 0. ti = r¯(k), where k is the smallest integer
where slope less than 0. This indicates that
• wij = w−ij for j ranked strictly above r¯(k) in terms of nominal return;
• wij = w+ij for j ranked strictly below r¯(k) in terms of nominal return;
• wij = 1− w−ij − w+ij for j ranked strictly equal to r¯(k) in terms of nominal return.
3.3.2 Benchmark Problem 2
maxx∈X
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
w¯ij r¯j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0, ∀i
other constraints
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3.4 Solution Approach
One of the traditional method to solve the robust optimization problem to derive the dual of the
inner problem and solve with the outer problem. This approach could be applied to our benchmark
problem, which has the linear inner problem. However, in other cases, the inner problem is a bilinear
problem which has multiple local minimizers, and leads computational difficulty to solve with its
dual formulation. We proposed two algorithms to solve the inner problem efficiently.
3.4.1 Inner Problem
The inner problems are the same bilinear problems for two problems described above. The bilinear
problem with linear constraints are known as NP hard problem. We first demonstrate several key
properties of the bilinear problem, then we proposed two algorithms to solve it based on our frame-
work. The first algorithm is that we first reformulate the bilinear problem to quadratic problem,
and deploy Chen and Burer [22]’s algorithm to solve the nonconvex quadratic problem globally via
completely positive programming. The second algorithm is that we separate the inner problem into
several linear problems by going through the vertexes of one feasible set. We compare all the results
and find the minimum one as the optimal solution of the inner problem.
Bilinear Programming
A function f(x, y) is called bilinear if it reduces to a linear one by fixing the vector x or y to a
particular value (Nahapetyan [53]). In general, the bilinear function can be represented as follows:
f(x, y) = aTx+ xTQy + bT y
where a, x ∈ Rn, b, y ∈ Rm, and Q is a matrix of dimension n×m.
The bilinear programming problem
min f(x, y) = aTx+ xTQy + bT y
s.t. x ∈ X, y ∈ Y
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where X and Y are nonempty polytopes in Rn and Rm, respectively.
Let V (X) and V (Y ) denote the vertex sets of X,Y respectively.
Theorem 3.1 (Horst and Tuy [36] and [37]) If X and Y are bounded then there is an optimal
solution (x∗, y∗) of problem 3.1, such that x∗ ∈ V (X) and y∗ ∈ V (Y ).
Theorem 3.2 (Horst and Tuy [36] and [37]) If (x∗, y∗) is a solution of problem 3.1, then
minx∈Xf(x, y∗) = f(x∗, y∗) = miny∈Y f(x∗, y)
Algorithm 1 : Transform the Bilinear Problem to Quadratic Problem
min(w,r)∈S wTQr
s.t. eTwi = 1,∀i = 1, 2, .., n
w− ≤ w ≤ w+
r− ≤ r ≤ r+
where Q =

x1 0 .. 0 x2 0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. xn 0 .. 0
0 x1 .. 0 0 x2 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 0 xn .. 0
0 0 .. 0 0 0 .. 0 .. .. .. .. 0 0 .. 0
0 0 .. x1 0 0 .. x2 .. .. .. .. 0 0 .. xn

T
m×mn
,
and w = (wT1 , w
T
2 , .., w
T
n ) with wi = (wi1, wi2, .., wim)
T .
Thus, w ∈ Rmn, r ∈ Rm, Q ∈ Rmn×m.
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Then this bilinear problem can be expressed as an (indefinite) quadratic problem
miny
1
2
yMyT
s.t. eT yi = 1,∀i = 1, 2, .., n
y−i ≤ yi ≤ y+i ,∀i = 1, 2, .., n
eT z ≤ α,
r = r¯ − rˆz
where y = (yT1 , y
T
2 , .., y
T
n , r
T , zT ) with yi = wi = (wi1, wi2, .., wim)T , r = (r1, r2, ..., rm),
and z = (z1, z2, ..., zm)
and M =

0 Q 0
QT 0 0
0 0 0

Then we could use the completely positive programming method developed by Chen and Burer
[22] to solve inner non-convex quadratic problem to global optimal.
Algorithm 2 : Mapping the vertexes of one feasible region
In our problem settings, candidate managers could be as many as we need to put into the model.
But asset classes are limited to certain amount. The three main asset classes are equities (stocks),
fixed-income (bonds) and cash equivalents (money market instruments). As more and more invest-
ment strategies are emerging, hedge fund, private equity, commodities, etc are also be classified as
an asset class in the portfolio management context. However, the number of asset classes are still
with limited and manageable manner comparing to the number of candidate managers.
There are some properties of the feasible set of asset returns: 1) the feasible set of asset returns
are separate with the feasible set of asset allocation, 2) the feasible set is under box constraint plus
one hyper plane, and 3) limited number of constraints leads to limited number of vertexes. Based
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on these three attractive properties and Theorem 4, we developed following algorithm to solve the
inner problem efficiently:
Step 1: Find all the vertexes of the feasible set in terms of asset return r;
Step 2: For each of the vertex, solve the inner problem in terms of w,
Step 3: Compare the optimal solution of each vertex, and the minimum one is the global optimal
solution for the inner problem.
3.4.2 Outer Problem
The outer problem is a quadratic programming problem with fixed w and r get from inner problem,
maxx∈X
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijrj
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
We could solve the problem in finite steps by adding delayed constraints for all previous itera-
tions s = 1, 2, ...S − 1, where S is the current iteration.
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maxz,x z
s.t. z ≤
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wsijr
s
j , ∀s = 1, 2, .., S
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
3.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we present two sets of experiments to illustrate our robust solution of manager
selection problem with uncertainty in asset allocations and asset returns. The first set of experiment
does not consider benchmark constraint in the model. The second set of experiment contains the
benchmark return return in the nominal model. For each set of the problem, we showed the change
of the manager selection policy with respect to the change of uncertainty budget on asset returns.
We also compared the robust model with the two benchmark model without uncertainty.
3.5.1 Without return benchmark and variance constraints
In this set of experiment, we do not include return benchmark in our problem. We changed the
uncertainty budget of asset returns form 0 to the largest amount of uncertainty.
The upper and lower bound of the problem
We first develop the upper and lower bound of the problem with uncertainty, which gives the port-
folio manager a rough bound of the return.
1. Upper Bound: uncertainty budget α is 0 (same with the benchmark 1 problem)
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maxx∈X minω∈W
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wij r¯j
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
In this case, the problem becomes benchmark 1 problem. From the numerical result, we can
see that when the uncertainty budget is very small, the manager selection policy is closed to the
benchmark 1.
2. Lower bound: uncertainty budget α is maximum
maxx∈X minω∈W
n∑
i=1
xi
m∑
j=1
wijr
−
j
s.t.
m∑
j=1
wij = 1,∀i
w−ij ≤ wij ≤ w+ij , ∀i, j
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
xi ≥ 0,∀i
other constraints
Four managers with four asset class
For this experiment, we choose four candidate fund managers invest in four same asset classes. We
aim to select fund manager’s which can protect the worst case return. Table 3.1, figure 3.1 and
figure 3.2 demonstrate manager allocation and the robust return. From the result we can see that
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the allocation is mainly via manager three and manager one. The robust return keep decreasing
as uncertainty budget increases. From table 3.2 and figure 3.3, we can see that when uncertainty
budget increase, the return of asset 2 goes to its lower bound first, and followed by asset 4, asset 3
and asset 1. Benchmark 2 problem gives the highest return, since no uncertainty is involved in the
problem. The one with full uncertainty budget gives the lowest return.
Table 3.1: Manager Allocation: Four Manager with Four Assets
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Objective
0.2 0 0 0.0405 0.9595 0.0237
0.4 0 0 1 0 0.0175
0.6 0.3781 0 0.6219 0 0.0124
0.8 0.3956 0 0.6044 0 0.0077
1 0.4058 0 0.5942 0 0.0029
1.2 0.4142 0 0.5858 0 -0.0004
1.4 0.431 0 0.569 0 -0.0039
1.6 0.2174 0 0.7826 0 -0.008
1.8 0.1552 0 0.8448 0 -0.0113
2 0.169 0 0.831 0 -0.0149
2.2 0.1567 0 0.8433 0 -0.017
2.4 0.1466 0 0.8534 0 -0.0192
2.6 0.1026 0 0.8974 0 -0.022
2.8 0.2632 0 0.7368 0 -0.025
3 0.2821 0 0.7179 0 -0.0276
3.2 0.2727 0 0.7273 0 -0.0294
3.4 0.2566 0 0.7434 0 -0.0312
3.6 0.2222 0 0.7778 0 -0.033
3.8 0.0566 0 0.9434 0 -0.0345
4 0 0 1 0 -0.037
Benchmark 1 0 1 0 0 0.0305
Benchmark 2 0 1 0 0 0.0342
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Figure 3.1: ManagerAllocation4A4M
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Table 3.2: Uncertainty Allocation
Uncertainty Budget Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 Asset 4
0.2 0 0.2 0 0
0.4 0 0.4 0 0
0.6 0 0.6 0 0
0.8 0 0.8 0 0
1 0 1 0 0
1.2 0 1 0 0.2
1.4 0 1 0 0.4
1.6 0 1 0 0.6
1.8 0 1 0 0.8
2 0 1 0 1
2.2 0 1 0.2 1
2.4 0 1 0.4 1
2.6 0 1 0.6 1
2.8 0 1 0.8 1
3 0 1 1 1
3.2 0.2 1 1 1
3.4 0.4 1 1 1
3.6 0.6 1 1 1
3.8 0.8 1 1 1
4 1 1 1 1
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Figure 3.3: AssetReturnUncertainty4A4M
Six managers with six asset class
For this experiment, we consider six candidate fund managers invest in six same asset classes. We
aim to select fund manager’s which can protect the worst case return. Table 3.3, figure 3.4 and
figure 3.5 demonstrate manager allocation and the robust return. From the result we can see that the
allocation concentrates on manager six. Table 3.4 and figure 3.6 show that when uncertainty budget
increase, the return of asset 5 goes to its lower bound first, and followed by asset 3, asset 1, asset 4,
asset 6 and asset 2, which is the same order of the value of the lower bound of each asset class.
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Table 3.3: Manager Allocation
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6 Objective
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0048
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.021
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0316
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0423
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0505
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0587
3.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0607
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0621
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0643
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0659
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0663
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0667
Benchmark 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0.013
Benchmark 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0.0371
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Figure 3.4: ManagerAllocation6A6M
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Figure 3.5: PortfolioReturn6A6M
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Table 3.4: Uncertainty Allocation
Uncertainty Budget z1 z2 z3 z4 z5 z6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
1 0 0 0 0 1 0
1.5 0 0 0.5 0 1 0
2 0 0 1 0 1 0
2.5 0.5 0 1 0 1 0
3 1 0 1 0 1 0
3.5 1 0 1 0.5 1 0
4 1 0 1 1 1 0
4.5 1 0 1 1 1 0.5
5 1 0 1 1 1 1
5.5 1 0.5 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 3.6: AssetReturnUncertainty6A6M
Twelve managers with six asset class
In this experiment, we aim to select fund managers from twelve candidate managers, and each of
them invest in six asset classes. As shown in figure 3.8 , robust return decreases as uncertainty
budget increases. When uncertainty budget is very small, all the money allocate to manager 7. As
the uncertainty increases, money are allocated through manager 7, manager 9, and manager 12. As
the uncertainty set increases above 5, all money allocate to manager 7 again.
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Table 3.5: Manager Allocation
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5 0.0681 0 0 0 0 0
4 0.0893 0 0 0 0 0
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benchmark 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Benchmark 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty Budget Manager 7 Manager 8 Manager 9 Manager 10 Manager 11 Manager 12 Objective
0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0194
1 0.4527 0 0 0 0 0.5473 -0.0263
1.5 0.4797 0 0 0 0 0.5203 -0.0329
2 0.0746 0 0 0 0 0.9254 -0.0388
2.5 0.9273 0 0 0 0 0.0727 -0.0419
3 0.8172 0 0.0601 0 0 0.1227 -0.0441
3.5 0.8094 0 0.0017 0 0 0.1209 -0.0475
4 0.9107 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0493
4.5 0.9409 0 0.0591 0 0 0 -0.0508
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0536
5.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0539
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0542
Benchmark 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0081
Benchmark 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0.0296
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Figure 3.7: ManagerAllocation6A12M
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Table 3.6: Uncertainty Allocation
Uncertainty Budget Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3 Asset 4 Asset 5 Asset 6
0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 1 0.5 0 0 0
2 0 1 1 0 0 0
2.5 0 1 1 0 0 0.5
3 0 1 1 0 0 1
3.5 0 1 1 0.5 0 1
4 0 1 1 1 0 1
4.5 0 1 1 1 0.5 1
5 0 1 1 1 1 1
5.5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1
6 1 1 1 1 1 1
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Figure 3.9: AssetReturnUncertainty6A12M
3.5.2 With return benchmark
For this set of experiment, we test how the benchmark return affect manager’s selection policy
together with the uncertainty in asset allocation and in asset return. From our experiment, as bench-
mark return increases, manager allocation is more depend on the benchmark return level.
Four Managers with Four Assets
For the four managers with four asset case, we choose 2%, 3%, 3.2% and 3.4% as the benchmark
return. Table 3.7 shows the nominal return of each manager. When the benchmark return level is
very low, the problem is the same with the problem without benchmark return, since it could always
be achieved. As benchmark return increases, manager 3 first takes more weights, and then was
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substitute by manager 2 and manager 4. As benchmark return becomes as high as 3.4%, all money
allocate to manager 2, since other manager has a much lower expect return, which could not meet
the benchmark requirement. 3.10 shows the robust portfolio return changes with uncertainty level
for each benchmark return level. As benchmark return level increase, the worst case return become
more significant low as the concentration effect. All risk concentrate to one manager. Table 3.8 to
figure 3.14 show the detailed manager allocation information.
Table 3.7: Nominal Return
Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4
Nominal Return 0.0238 0.0343 0.0305 0.0313
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Figure 3.10: Robust Portfolio Return with Benchmark Return
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Table 3.8: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=2%
Return Benchmark=2%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 objective
0.5 0.3636 0 0.6364 0 0.0149
1 0.4058 0 0.5942 0 0.0029
1.5 0.0749 0 0.9251 0 -0.006
2 0.169 0 0.831 0 -0.0149
2.5 0.1282 0 0.8718 0 -0.0215
3 0.2821 0 0.7179 0 -0.0276
3.5 0.2432 0 0.7568 0 -0.0321
4 0 0 1 0 -0.037
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Figure 3.11: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 2%
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Table 3.9: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3%
Return Benchmark=3%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 objective
0.5 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 0.0146
1 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 0.0001
1.5 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 -0.0101
2 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 -0.0164
2.5 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 -0.0234
3 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 -0.0286
3.5 0.0741 0 0.9259 0 -0.0324
4 0 0 1 0 -0.037
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Figure 3.12: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3%
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Table 3.10: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3.2%
Return Benchmark=3.2%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 objective
0.5 0 0.25 0 0.75 0.0071
1 0 0.25 0 0.75 -0.0182
1.5 0 0.3386 0.3545 0.3069 -0.0268
2 0 0.3545 0.418 0.2275 -0.034
2.5 0 0.3677 0.4707 0.1617 -0.0383
3 0 0.3805 0.5219 0.0977 -0.0428
3.5 0 0.4 0.6 0 -0.0462
4 0 0.4 0.6 0 -0.0502
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Figure 3.13: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3.2%
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Table 3.11: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3.4%
Return Benchmark=3.4%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 objective
0.5 0 0.9833 0 0.0167 -0.0086
1 0 0.9833 0 0.0167 -0.0532
1.5 0 0.985 0.0067 0.0083 -0.0602
2 0 0.985 0.0065 0.0085 -0.0671
2.5 0 0.9853 0.0078 0.0069 -0.0682
3 0 0.9867 0.0133 0 -0.0694
3.5 0 0.9867 0.0133 0 -0.0695
4 0 0.9867 0.0133 0 -0.0696
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Figure 3.14: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3.4%
Six Managers with Six Assets
For six managers with six assets case, we choose 2%, 3%, 3.5% and 3.7% as the benchmark return.
Table ?? shows the nominal return of each manager. Again, when the benchmark return level is
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2%, 3%, the problem is the same with no benchmark return problem. All the money concentrate
to manager 6. As benchmark return increases, manager 6 takes less weight and manager 3 takes
more weight in the portfolio. As benchmark return becomes as high as 3.7%, all money allocate
to manager 3, since other manager has a much lower expect return, which could not meet the
benchmark requirement. 3.10 shows the robust portfolio return changes with uncertainty level for
each benchmark return level. As benchmark return level increase, the worst case return become
more significant low as the concentration effect. All risk concentrate to one manager. Table 3.13 to
figure ?? show the detailed manager allocation information.
Table 3.12: Nominal Return
Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
Nominal Return 0.0371 0.0118 0.0321 0.0025 0.027 0.0277
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Figure 3.15: Robust Portfolio Return with Benchmark Return
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Table 3.13: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=2%
Return Benchmark=2%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6 objective
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0048
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.021
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0316
2 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0423
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0505
3 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0587
3.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0607
4 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0621
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0643
5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0659
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0663
6 0 0 0 0 0 1 -0.0667
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Figure 3.16: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 2.0%
81
3.5. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Table 3.14: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3%
Return Benchmark=3%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6 objective
0.5 0 0 0.5281 0 0 0.4719 -0.0047
1 0.2468 0 0 0 0 0.7532 -0.021
1.5 0.2468 0 0 0 0 0.7532 -0.0316
2 0.2468 0 0 0 0 0.7532 -0.0422
2.5 0 0 0.5281 0 0 0.4719 -0.0505
3 0 0 0.5281 0 0 0.4719 -0.0587
3.5 0 0 0.5293 0 0.0073 0.4634 -0.0607
4 0 0 0.565 0 0 0.435 -0.0627
4.5 0.0537 0 0.4271 0 0 0.5192 -0.0643
5 0.0106 0 0.5054 0 0 0.4839 -0.0659
5.5 0.0106 0 0.5054 0 0 0.4839 -0.0663
6 0 0 0.5281 0 0 0.4719 -0.0667
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Figure 3.17: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3%
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Table 3.15: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3.5%
Return Benchmark=3.5%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6 objective
0.5 0.5878 0 0.4122 0 0 0 -0.0092
1 0.7804 0 0 0 0 0.2196 -0.0294
1.5 0.7804 0 0 0 0 0.2196 -0.0387
2 0.7758 0 0.0098 0 0 0.2144 -0.048
2.5 0.5878 0 0.4122 0 0 0 -0.0548
3 0.5878 0 0.4122 0 0 0 -0.0613
3.5 0.611 0 0.3624 0 0 0.0265 -0.0629
4 0.6536 0 0.2815 0 0 0.0649 -0.0645
4.5 0.7375 0 0.0918 0 0.0004 0.1702 -0.0662
5 0.5878 0 0.4122 0 0 0 -0.0669
5.5 0.6145 0 0.3551 0 0 0.0304 -0.0686
6 0.5878 0 0.4122 0 0 0 -0.0703
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Figure 3.18: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3.5%
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Table 3.16: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=3.7%
Return Benchmark=3.7%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6 objective
0.5 0.9884 0 0.0116 0 0 0 -0.0198
1 0.9938 0 0 0 0 0.0062 -0.0477
1.5 0.9913 0 0.0054 0 0 0.0033 -0.054
2 0.9884 0 0.0116 0 0 0 -0.0604
2.5 0.9938 0 0 0 0 0.0062 -0.0659
3 0.9884 0 0.0116 0 0 0 -0.0711
3.5 0.9927 0 0.0025 0 0 0.0048 -0.0724
4 0.9923 0 0.0033 0 0 0.0044 -0.0738
4.5 0.9923 0 0.0033 0 0 0.0044 -0.0763
5 0.9923 0 0.0032 0 0 0.0044 -0.0774
5.5 0.9923 0 0.0033 0 0 0.0044 -0.0778
6 0.9884 0 0.0116 0 0 0 -0.0796
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Figure 3.19: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 3.7%
Twelve Manager with Six Assets
For the experiment of twelve managers with six assets, we can see the same story here. As bench-
mark return level increase, managers with high expected return takes over more weights but causes
more severe worst return scenarios.
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Figure 3.20: Robust Portfolio Return with Benchmark Return
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Table 3.17: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=0%
Return Benchmark=0%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty Budget Manager 7 Manager 8 Manager 9 Manager 10 Manager 11 Manager 12 Objective
0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0194
1 0.4527 0 0 0 0 0.5473 -0.0263
1.5 0.4797 0 0 0 0 0.5203 -0.0329
2 0.5746 0 0 0 0 0.4254 -0.0388
2.5 0.7076 0 0 0 0 0.2924 -0.0421
3 0.8127 0 0.0654 0 0 0.1219 -0.0442
3.5 0.8747 0 0 0 0 0.1253 -0.0475
4 0.8578 0 0 0 0 0.1417 -0.0494
4.5 0.9409 0 0.0591 0 0 0 -0.0508
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0536
5.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0539
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0542
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Figure 3.21: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 0%
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Table 3.18: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=2%
Return Benchmark=2%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty Budget Manager 7 Manager 8 Manager 9 Manager 10 Manager 11 Manager 12 Objective
0.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0194
1 0.701 0 0 0 0 0.299 -0.0283
1.5 0.701 0 0 0 0 0.299 -0.0341
2 0.701 0 0 0 0 0.299 -0.0403
2.5 0.9272 0 0 0 0 0.0728 -0.0419
3 0.8128 0 0.0653 0 0 0.1219 -0.0442
3.5 0.8748 0 0 0 0 0.1252 -0.0475
4 0.9072 0 0 0 0 0.0928 -0.0494
4.5 0.9409 0 0.0591 0 0 0 -0.0508
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0536
5.5 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0539
6 1 0 0 0 0 0 -0.0542
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Figure 3.22: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 2%
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Table 3.19: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=2.5%
Return Benchmark=2.5%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5 0 0 0 0 0.0522 0
4 0 0 0 0 0.0537 0
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty Budget Manager 7 Manager 8 Manager 9 Manager 10 Manager 11 Manager 12 Objective
0.5 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0228
1 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0342
1.5 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0403
2 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0463
2.5 0.5441 0.0304 0.4255 0 0 0 -0.0491
3 0.4696 0.0569 0.4735 0 0 0 -0.0517
3.5 0.4775 0 0.4702 0 0 0 -0.0538
4 0.4734 0 0.4729 0 0 0 -0.0557
4.5 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0572
5 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0583
5.5 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0586
6 0.6295 0 0.3705 0 0 0 -0.0589
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Figure 3.23: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 2.5%
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Table 3.20: Manager Allocation: Benchmark Return=2.9%
Return Benchmark=2.9%
Uncertainty Budget Manager 1 Manager 2 Manager 3 Manager 4 Manager 5 Manager 6
0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
1.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 0 0 0
2.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0
3.5 0 0 0 0 0.0128 0
4 0.0089 0 0 0 0 0
4.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 0 0 0 0 0 0
Uncertainty Budget Manager 7 Manager 8 Manager 9 Manager 10 Manager 11 Manager 12 Objective
0.5 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0278
1 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0395
1.5 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0468
2 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.054
2.5 0.0552 0 0.9301 0 0 0.0146 -0.0559
3 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0582
3.5 0.0479 0 0.9393 0 0 0 -0.0601
4 0.0584 0 0.9327 0 0 0 -0.0619
4.5 0.0662 0 0.9245 0 0 0.0093 -0.0635
5 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0652
5.5 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0655
6 0.0851 0 0.9149 0 0 0 -0.0659
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Figure 3.24: Robust Portfolio Manager Allocation with Benchmark Return = 2.9%
3.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we proposed a robust framework that takes into account two sources of uncertainty
from manager asset allocation and asset return, in the context of manager selection and portfolio
management. Upper and lower bound was also provided in our research. We investigated manager
allocation pattern in two scenarios of without the return benchmark and without the return bench-
mark. In addition, we explored the special structure of the problem, and proposed two approaches to
solve the problem efficiently. In addition, with modified algorithm, this model could also be applied
to hedge fund strategies with lower bound smaller than zero and upper bound larger than one.
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